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Extradition between the UK and Ireland after Brexit will be particularly affected by a
No-Deal Brexit. In this post, Paul Arnell (Robert Gordon University) and Gemma
Davies (Northumbria University) bring a closer understanding of the problems on the
horizon and ways of mitigating them.
The UK’s departure from the EU means the loss of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)
for the UK. This will have a negative impact on the ability of the UK to extradite wanted
persons from all its former EU partners. It was hoped that the UK and EU would reach a
deal on criminal justice and security cooperation which would provide for a system of
extradition which would closely mirror the terms of the EAW. With less than 50 days until
the transition period ends that is looking increasingly unlikely. The consequences of
falling back on the European Convention on Extradition 1957 (ECE) are particularly acute
for the UK and Ireland.
After the creation of the Irish Free State and the establishment of the Common Travel
Area extradition between the UK and Ireland was facilitated through the backing of a
warrants system. Whilst this worked well between Great Britain and Ireland this was not
the case between the Republic and Northern Ireland. Having its origins in Irish case law,
that system of extradition broke down from 1928 to 1965 during which time there were no
practically applicable arrangements between the two. New legislative provisions in 1965
formalised extradition, but the arrangement remained a hybrid which incorporated
aspects of orthodox international extradition agreements and the previously applicable
backing of warrants system.
In 1973 both the UK and Ireland joined what was then the European Community. Whilst
integration in the field of police and criminal justice matters was originally a challenge, it
was eventually recognised that it must follow as a corollary of free movement. In this vein,
the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant was adopted in 2002. Both
Ireland and the UK have been part of the EAW since its inception and amended their law
in accordance with it. The EAW facilitates a simplified procedure enabling surrender
decisions to be made by judicial authorities on the basis of mutual recognition. The
benefits of the system are heightened in the Ireland-UK historical and political context.
They include the absence of a political offence exception and orthodox double criminality
requirement. The EAW contains limited grounds for refusal, and forbids a bar on the
extradition of nationals. It has created an effective and efficient process which plays a
crucial role in Ireland-UK criminal justice cooperation today.
UK participation in the EAW is not possible after 31 December 2020. However, both the
UK and EU have proposed a replacement which closely mirrors the agreement between
the EU and Norway/Iceland, which in turn is similar to the EAW. A mutually agreeable
2/3
deal on extradition is within touching distance, but a few key issues remain. The UK is
seeking a proportionality test for incoming requests and a test of trial readiness. Both are
tests that the UK has brought into domestic law to deal with concerns about the operation
of the EAW. The EU is demanding that the ECJ should have sole jurisdiction to interpret
provisions or concepts of Union law. The UK wants no role for the ECJ and instead
suggests a political resolution of disputes via a joint committee. These issues are not
insurmountable. However, time is now very short. Surrender is merely one part of a
proposed comprehensive agreement between the EU and the UK. There are a
considerable number of obstacles still standing in the way of the conclusion of an
agreement.
In the event of an agreement between the EU and UK not being concluded and ratified by
31 December 2020 the UK and Ireland will fall back on the ECE. This is clearly sub-
optimal. The ECE operates through diplomatic channels and therefore extradition entails
political approval in the extraditing country. Unlike the EAW, there are no strict time
limits and states are not required to extradite their own nationals. Further, under the ECE
there are no agreed exceptions to the dual criminality requirement and several safeguards
for requested persons in part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 would no longer be available.
An important point affecting the efficiency of a future extradition process is the loss of the
Schengen Information System II. Whilst distinct from the EAW, it operates alongside it by
providing real-time warrants and alerts. Its loss means Interpol Red Notices using
diplomatic channels will be relied upon. Most EU countries have ceased using
Interpol inter se. Overall, the ECE is out-dated and little-used amongst the Member
States. This may lead to UK warrants not being dealt with as a priority and UK
prosecution authorities having to rely on informal in-country relationships to a greater
extent.
A possible solution to the loss of the EAW in the event of a No Deal is a bilateral Ireland-
UK extradition treaty. There is precedent for bilateral agreements on extradition which
can closely mirror, or in fact surpass, the EAW in terms of efficiency. Five Nordic
countries (not all of which are EU members) have a regional system of extradition termed
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the ‘Nordic Arrest Warrant’ (NAW). The NAW mirrors a number of aspects of the EAW
and mutual recognition is made explicit. The notable differences are that there are even
lower minimum penalties and double criminality is completely abolished under the NAW.
Further, procedural time limits are shorter than those within the EAW. It is, therefore,
possible for Ireland and the UK to conclude a bilateral extradition agreement with terms
that provide for even closer cooperation than the EAW. The drivers for a regional Nordic
system of extradition are equally present between the UK and Ireland. Nordic countries
have a closely connected history, similarities in their legal systems and languages and
removed their borders long before the advent of Schengen.
Lessons must be learnt from Ireland-UK extradition history. The EAW depoliticised
extradition in the Irish-UK context and whilst there is political will on both sides for this
to continue, falling back on the 1957 Convention forces extradition back into the political
space. In the absence of a multilateral agreement, the optimal solution for Ireland and the
UK is a bilateral extradition arrangement. Whilst Brexit changes the status of UK citizens,
who no longer enjoy EU citizenship, it importantly does not change the fundamental tenet
of the Good Friday Agreement. Citizens of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
are to be treated equally, they can choose Irish citizenship, British citizenship, or both.
They are free to choose where to live, work and study. The Common Travel Area subsists.
The shared history of the UK and Ireland, particularly in relation to their citizens living on
the island of Ireland, lends strong justification to a continued close extradition
relationship.
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